Models, Representation, and Computation

Cyrille Imbert (Archives Poincaré, Université de Lorraine, Nancy)

Vincent Ardourel (IHPST, Paris)

Sorin Bangu (University of Bergen)

The Topical Collection follows up on the “Models, Representation, and Computation” conference (MRC 2024) that took place in Paris, 13-15 June 2024 (see https://mrc2024.sciencesconf.org/ for details). However, the call is open to submissions of papers that were not presented at the conference.

Investigations about the roles models play in science have been recognized for more than four decades. They have sparked rich philosophical debates about the various ways in which scientists develop knowledge by developing real or fictional representations and investigating these representations through various inferential techniques.

Over recent years, inquiries investigating the interplays between representational and inferential practices, the roles of models within them, and how traditional scientific activities are thereby carried out have specifically constituted a burgeoning nexus of activity. Traditional lines of inquiry concerning the philosophical analysis of models and their scientific functions keep flourishing and bringing insightful perspectives. Novel accounts of models are still worked out. More specified discussions of the types of models (e.g., “toy models”, “minimal models”) and how they play specific roles (e.g., developing understanding) are developed. Grist to the mill also comes from recent developments in the philosophy of science, for example, concerning the place and role of values, epistemic or not, in the development of models, simulations, and computational science. Novel insights are also brought by the philosophical focus on still developing techniques and fields such as assimilations techniques, coupled models, or ensemble methods in climate science, computational phylogenetics, or formal verification methods, which illustrates the various cross-constraints between representational, inferential, and justificatory needs in contemporary computational activities. Finally, a specific mention needs to be made about the massive developments of AI in science, which disrupts existing practices by integrating radically distinct types of models within the traditional activities of science, offers novel ways of carrying them out, and potentially blurs existing distinctions between what should count as models, data, and merely computational tools.

Submissions tackling questions related to the uses of models and representations for research, pedagogy, or mediation purposes are welcome.

Overall, this topical collection brings together new philosophical perspectives on scientific models, scientific representation, and computational science, in particular its recent developments. Its goal is to put together and catalyze the next wave of research on these research topics by exploring research questions such as:

- How much do novel representational and computational practices across science fit existing accounts of representational and inferential activities? How do these practices relate to traditional items such as theories, experiments, and thought experiments?

- Do novel modeling and computational techniques renew traditional issues about scientific units, unification, and the unity of science? Do they influence the scientific and social organization of science?

- Do these practices and techniques correspond to novel representational and reasoning styles or extensions of existing styles?

- How does datification influence the development of new types of models and inferential practices?

- How does datification influence how model-based activities are justified?

- How is formal verification used for computer simulations and computational science?

- How is perturbative theory applied in scientific models?

- Are there novel cases of minimal models, and why does it matter?

- Does machine learning renew the epistemology of scientific models?

- How is explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) performed in science?

- Is the Humphreysian description of computational activities in terms of representational and computational prosthesis that “extend ourselves” adequate?

- What epistemological frameworks are adequate to account for the development of computational science? Externalism? Reliabilism? Evidentialism? Naturalism?

- Is there a need to develop specific notions of accessibility, opacity, and modularity to account for novel activities?

- Do novel representational and computational techniques require novel, modified, or specific scientific values and norms?

Investigations pertaining to all technological and scientific fields and all types of science (e.g., foundational, theoretical and applied, public, private, and commercial) are welcome.

For further information, please contact the guest editor(s) by sending an email to [email protected].

The deadline for submissions is June 30th, 2026.

Submissions are to be made via https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx