🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix basic auth password timing attack - #5
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Co-authored-by: ddqd <[email protected]>
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🚨 Severity: MEDIUM
💡 Vulnerability: Basic auth password verification logic in
packages/opencode/src/server/auth.tsandpackages/server/src/auth.tswas using simple string equality comparison (===) to compare the provided password against the expected password. This is vulnerable to timing attacks as string comparison stops as soon as characters don't match, which theoretically can allow an attacker to guess the password character by character.🎯 Impact: An attacker could guess the expected password via time-based side channels.
🔧 Fix: Used
crypto.timingSafeEqualfor a constant-time comparison. We convert both strings to UTF-8 Buffers and ensure they are of equal length before comparison.✅ Verification: Ensure the test suite passes (
bun testin packages). Checked out and visually verifiedpackages/server/src/auth.tsandpackages/opencode/src/server/auth.ts.PR created automatically by Jules for task 7572986804942932230 started by @ddqd