🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix timing attack vulnerability in basic auth - #2
🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix timing attack vulnerability in basic auth#2ddqd wants to merge 1 commit into
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Co-authored-by: ddqd <[email protected]>
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🚨 Severity: MEDIUM
💡 Vulnerability: Basic auth password verification was using
===, which is vulnerable to a timing attack. An attacker could measure the response time to guess the password one character at a time.🎯 Impact: An attacker could potentially bypass authentication by sequentially guessing the password.
🔧 Fix: Replaced the
===comparison withtimingSafeEqualfromnode:crypto. Implemented a length check (sincetimingSafeEqualthrows if lengths differ) that performs a dummytimingSafeEqualto avoid leaking the password length via early return timing differences.✅ Verification: Verified by running the test suite (
bun run --cwd packages/opencode test auth.test.ts,httpapi-authorization) which confirmed the server's authentication still functions correctly without regressions.PR created automatically by Jules for task 3857241221765493979 started by @ddqd