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166 lines (128 loc) · 5.83 KB
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# Security helpers - URL validation, safe fetch, path guards, label sanitisation
from __future__ import annotations
import html
import re
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from pathlib import Path
_ALLOWED_SCHEMES = {"http", "https"}
_MAX_FETCH_BYTES = 52_428_800 # 50 MB hard cap for binary downloads
_MAX_TEXT_BYTES = 10_485_760 # 10 MB hard cap for HTML / text
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# URL validation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def validate_url(url: str) -> str:
"""Raise ValueError if *url* is not http or https.
Blocks file://, ftp://, data:, and any other scheme that could be used
for SSRF or local file access.
"""
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme.lower() not in _ALLOWED_SCHEMES:
raise ValueError(
f"Blocked URL scheme '{parsed.scheme}' - only http and https are allowed. "
f"Got: {url!r}"
)
return url
class _NoFileRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
"""Redirect handler that re-validates every redirect target.
Prevents open-redirect SSRF attacks where an http:// URL redirects
to file:// or an internal address.
"""
def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
validate_url(newurl) # raises ValueError if scheme is wrong
return super().redirect_request(req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl)
def _build_opener() -> urllib.request.OpenerDirector:
return urllib.request.build_opener(_NoFileRedirectHandler)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Safe fetch
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def safe_fetch(url: str, max_bytes: int = _MAX_FETCH_BYTES, timeout: int = 30) -> bytes:
"""Fetch *url* and return raw bytes.
Protections applied:
- URL scheme validated (http / https only)
- Redirects re-validated via _NoFileRedirectHandler
- Response body capped at *max_bytes* (streaming read)
- Non-2xx status raises urllib.error.HTTPError
- Network errors propagate as urllib.error.URLError / OSError
Raises:
ValueError - disallowed scheme or redirect target
urllib.error.HTTPError - non-2xx HTTP status
urllib.error.URLError - DNS / connection failure
OSError - size cap exceeded
"""
validate_url(url)
opener = _build_opener()
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 graphify/1.0"})
with opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
# urllib raises HTTPError for non-2xx when using urlopen directly;
# with a custom opener we check manually to be safe.
status = getattr(resp, "status", None) or getattr(resp, "code", None)
if status is not None and not (200 <= status < 300):
raise urllib.error.HTTPError(url, status, f"HTTP {status}", {}, None)
chunks: list[bytes] = []
total = 0
while True:
chunk = resp.read(65_536)
if not chunk:
break
total += len(chunk)
if total > max_bytes:
raise OSError(
f"Response from {url!r} exceeds size limit "
f"({max_bytes // 1_048_576} MB). Aborting download."
)
chunks.append(chunk)
return b"".join(chunks)
def safe_fetch_text(url: str, max_bytes: int = _MAX_TEXT_BYTES, timeout: int = 15) -> str:
"""Fetch *url* and return decoded text (UTF-8, replacing bad bytes).
Wraps safe_fetch with tighter defaults for HTML / text content.
"""
raw = safe_fetch(url, max_bytes=max_bytes, timeout=timeout)
return raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Path validation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def validate_graph_path(path: str | Path, base: Path | None = None) -> Path:
"""Resolve *path* and verify it stays inside *base*.
*base* defaults to the `graphify-out` directory relative to CWD.
Also requires the base directory to exist, so a caller cannot
trick graphify into reading files before any graph has been built.
Raises:
ValueError - path escapes base, or base does not exist
FileNotFoundError - resolved path does not exist
"""
if base is None:
base = Path("graphify-out").resolve()
base = base.resolve()
if not base.exists():
raise ValueError(
f"Graph base directory does not exist: {base}. "
"Run /graphify first to build the graph."
)
resolved = Path(path).resolve()
try:
resolved.relative_to(base)
except ValueError:
raise ValueError(
f"Path {path!r} escapes the allowed directory {base}. "
"Only paths inside graphify-out/ are permitted."
)
if not resolved.exists():
raise FileNotFoundError(f"Graph file not found: {resolved}")
return resolved
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Label sanitisation (mirrors code-review-graph's _sanitize_name pattern)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_CONTROL_CHAR_RE = re.compile(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]")
_MAX_LABEL_LEN = 256
def sanitize_label(text: str) -> str:
"""Strip control characters, cap length, then HTML-escape.
Applied to all node labels and edge titles before they are embedded
in pyvis HTML output or returned via the MCP server, preventing both
XSS and broken visualisations from malformed source identifiers.
"""
text = _CONTROL_CHAR_RE.sub("", text)
if len(text) > _MAX_LABEL_LEN:
text = text[:_MAX_LABEL_LEN]
return html.escape(text)